

Al-Jāmi'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies - ISSN: 0126-012X (p); 2356-0912 (e)
Vol. 53, no. 1 (2015), pp. 225-250 , doi: 10.14421/ajis.2015.531.225-250

RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND PEACE BUILDING

The Roles of *Tuan Guru* and *Pedanda* in Conflict Resolution in Lombok - Indonesia¹

Suprpto

State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) Mataram, Indonesia

email: praptolombok@gmail.com

Abstract

In some situations where the state is too weak to gain trust from the people, religious leaders have a significant role in maintaining social harmony. In many cases of the social unrest as what happened in Lombok, 'Tuan Guru and Pedanda played important roles in building a peaceful condition. Tuan Guru and Pedanda with their authorities have vital influences in calming down their Muslim and Hindu communities respectively. With their own ways, they were able to localize conflict issues, so much so that the social conflicts did not escalate to become greater massive riot. This article describes a number of efforts made by Tuan Guru and Pedanda to establish peace in Lombok, such as: calming down the followers; localizing issue to reduce mass panic; reminding members of the family or community to resist social prejudice; socializing religious teachings especially the need to forge harmony; promoting "Semeton Sasak and Batur Bali" as a value of brotherhood among Balinese-Hindu and Sasaknese-Muslim; creating social sanctions against those who violated the agreements among communities; and improving the effectiveness of customary law known as awik-awik.

[Pemimpin atau tokoh agama memiliki peran signifikan dalam merawat harmoni sosial, terutama di saat negara kurang memperoleh kepercayaan dari rakyat. Dalam sejumlah kasus kerusuhan sosial yang terjadi Lombok, Tuan Guru dan Pedanda memainkan peran penting dalam menciptakan kedamaian. Dengan otoritas mereka, Tuan Guru dan Pedanda mampu

¹ I would like thank Ade Alimah and M. Abdun Nasir for their insightful comments and editing my English.

menenangkan massa. Dengan caranya sendiri, mereka mampu melokalisasi isu, sehingga eskalasi konflik tidak meluas menjadi kerusuhan yang massif. Artikel ini mendeskripsikan sejumlah upaya yang dikembangkan oleh Tuan Guru dan Pedanda dalam rangka bina damai di Lombok, seperti menenangkan jamaah; melokalisasi isu konflik agar massa tidak panic; mengingatkan keluarga atau anggota komunitas untuk menahan diri; mensosialisasikan nilai-nilai harmoni dalam agama, mempromosikan konsep “Semeton Sasak and Batur Bali” sebagai sebuah nilai persaudaraan antara orang Hindu-Bali dan Sasak-Muslim; menciptakan sanksi sosial bagi mereka yang melanggar kesepakatan bersama; dan meningkatkan efektifitas hukum adat yang dikenal dengan sebutan awik-awik.]

Keywords: conflict resolution, Tuan Guru, Pedanda, peace building

A. Introduction

Lombok, the province of West Nusa Tenggara, is known as the island of “a thousand of mosques”. This designation does not only indicate the number of the mosques existing on the island, but also refers deliberately to the fact that Islamic nuance appears clearly in all aspects of Lombok community’s life.² A large number of educational institutions such as madrasah and Islamic boarding schools are also some additional indicators of the establishment of Islam in the Lombok society.

In addition to being the second majority religion in Lombok, Hindus have lived in the island for centuries. This extended presence has created dynamic social interactions with Sasak, the indigenous people of Lombok, in such broad fields as music, art, marriage and settlement. The Hindu-Balinese influences on Lombok, especially in Mataram and West Lombok, are ample. Not surprisingly, we often hear people saying that “in Bali you cannot see Lombok but in Lombok you can see both Bali and Lombok” confirming important Balinese influences on Lombok. This known saying suggests unique Hindu-Balinese interactions with their Muslim counterparts in Lombok. In terms of music, for instance, the Sasak traditional music called *gendang beleq* greatly resembles the Balinese traditional music. The traditional Sasak marriage of *merariq* has

² Although there are other variants in Lombok such as *IslamWetu Telu*, but Islam has been adopted for a long period by Lombok people, “being Sasak means being Muslim”; see Bartholomew John Ryan, *Alif Lam Mim: Kearifan Masyarakat Sasak*, trans. by Imron Rasyidi (Yogyakarta: Tiawa Wacana, 2001), p. 86.

in many ways similarities with the Balinese elopement.³ Another example of the Hindu-Balinese legacy of Karangasem Kingdom in Mataram is concerned with the Hindu pattern of housing and settlements.⁴

The legacy of segregated settlement in Mataram can be observed particularly in Cakranegara areas, which used to be the capital of Karangasem Kingdom. The segregation can be classified into four. First is Muslim community, where the majority community member is Muslim, such as Karang Tapen Kampong. Second is Hindu community whose members are Hindus, such as Karang Jasi Kampong. Third is Muslim community with Hindu minority members, such as Karang Taliwang Kampong, and four is Hindu community with Muslim minority members, such as Sindu Kampong. In such dynamic social relations, it is interesting to study the existence and role of religious leaders because they play an important role, especially in a paternalistic community, including in terms of managing conflict. Before we discuss more about their roles, we need to examine a number of studies on many aspects of Lombok and on conflict and resolution in Indonesia in general.

There are several studies on interreligious relations in Indonesia. Most of these studies focus mainly on Muslim-Christian relations, two principal missionary religions that often involve in competition, tension and conflict. However, Hindu-Muslim relations in Indonesia have not been sufficiently studied although the same issue in South Asia has been frequently explored because the frequency and volumes Muslim-Hindu conflicts and tension are high there. One of the studies on Hindu-Muslim relations in India was conducted by Ashutosh Varshney. Varshney contends that social cohesion can be established between Hindu and Muslim communities in those areas when they support civic engagement in civil organizations.⁵ Conflicts can be avoided when Muslims and Hindus involve in cooperation in many sectors of lives through a stable engagement.

Unlike Varshney's analysis on civic engagement, Christophe Jeffrelot stresses heightening ethno-religious ideology amongst communities and exploitation of communal and sectarian issues by politicians as the

³ Fathurrahman Zakaria, *Mozaik Budaya Orang Mataram* (Mataram: Yayasan Sumurmas Al-Hamidy, 1998), p. 37.

⁴ Anak Agung Ktut Agung, *Kupu-kupu Kuning yang Terbang di Selat Lombok: Lintasan Sejarah Kerajaan Karangasem 1661-1950* (Denpasar: Upada Sastra, 1991), p. 69.

⁵ Ashutosh Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India* (London: Yale University Press, 2002), p. 11.

prime causes of conflict.⁶ According to Jaffrelot, politics exerts a greater influence on social disintegration and conflicts between Muslims and Hindus in India.⁷ A good example of heightening ethnic-religion-based ideology can be seen from the rise of Hindu nationalism in response to jihad ideology advocated by Muslims.

A piece of research that examines Hindu-Muslim relations was conducted by Erni Budiwanti. She is concerned with the Muslim minority community in the Hindu-majority island of Bali and the Muslim *wetu telu* community amidst of the growing strict Muslims in Bayan, North Lombok.⁸ She found that the Muslims in Pegayaman, North Bali, faced dilemmas in maintaining their collective-religious identity and in realizing their faiths. The same fate was real for the *wetu telu* community. The increasing influence of *tuan guru* spreading the forms of strict Islam (*waktu lima*) had marginalized the *wetu telu*. However, Budiwanti underscored different strategies that these minority Muslims envisaged to face the challenges. For the *wetu telu* Muslim community, the presence and spread of *waktu lima* in North Lombok was seen as threatening to their old tradition, Islamic practices and cultural identity, which differed significantly from those of *waktu lima*. In contrast, the minority Muslim in Pegayaman attempted to adapt themselves to the Balinese culture and local tradition without losing their religious identity.⁹ One palpable example of this cultural acculturation is expressed in the adoption of the Balinese names. Thus, Muslims in Pegayaman combine the Balinese and Islamic names such as Nyoman Ali, Wayan Jamil and Ketut Abdurhaman. The first names are Balinese while the last or family names are Islamic.

One research specifically examining Hindu-Muslim relations in Mataram was carried out by Mustain and Mukhlis.¹⁰ Their research

⁶ Christophe Jaffrelot, "The 2002 Pogrom in Gujarat: The Post-9/11 Face of Hindu Nationalist and Anti-Muslim Violence", in *Religion and Violence in South Asia: Theory and Practice*, ed. by John Hinnells and Richard King (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 173–92.

⁷ Christophe Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

⁸ Erni Budiwanti, "Maintaining Identity and Inter-religious Tolerance: Case Studies of Muslim Minorities in Lombok and Bali", in *Communal Conflicts in Contemporary Indonesia*, ed. by Chaidar S. Bamualim and Karlina Helamnita (Jakarta: Pusat Bahasa dan Budaya IAIN Jakarta & The Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 2002), pp. 43–6.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 35–52.

¹⁰ Mustain and Mukhlis, *Hubungan Hindu Muslim di Kota Mataram: Kajian Potensi Integrasi dan Konflik dalam Hubungan Antaragama* (Mataram: Lemlit STAIN, 2003).

focused not only on conflicts but also potencies of integration. To detect the potencies of conflict and integration, they went beyond empirical investigations and searched for the theological basis of social interaction. Their research confirms that no Hindu exclusive theology spurring hatred against other religions was found.

This study continues this scholarly conversation and offers a profound analysis of the dynamic relationships between followers of different religious traditions, namely Hindus and Muslims in Mataram Lombok. Unlike the previous studies, my study aims to portrait interrelations between Hindus and Muslims especially on the role of the religious leader, *Tuan Guru* in Islam and *Pedanda* in Hindu. *Tuan Guru* and *Pedanda* have big influence in constructing and transforming societies.

In his study about *tuan gurus*, Jeremy Kingsley states that these religious leaders for Sasak-Muslim serve as social stabilizers and mediators in many tense occasions and conflicts including political conflicts.¹¹ In the conflict management, the roles of *tuan gurus* are even more effective than those of state apparatus, such as police, attorneys and other formal leaders. This is because the state loses its authority upon the fall of the New Order regime.¹² Meanwhile, *pedandas'* roles in building peace are also important although not as strong as those of *tuan gurus*. This study examines and compare their role in creating peace society of Muslim and Hindu in Lombok.

B. Some Tensions and Conflicts between Hindu and Muslim

1. Conflict between Karang Taliwang vis-à-vis Sindu and Tohpati

Communal conflicts between Karang Taliwang Muslims and Tohpati and Sindu Hindus in Cakranegara occurred in 1980s, 2000, 2012, and 2013. One of the conflict was stimulated by the establishment of a new mosque adjacent to an existing Hindu temple.¹³ Another conflict occurred in 2000 where the Hindus of Tohpati and Sindu were performing *Nyepi* ritual. At the same time, Muslims from a neighboring

¹¹ Jeremy Kingsley, "Tuan Guru, Community and Conflict in Lombok, Indonesia", MA Thesis (Melbourne: University of Melbourne, 2010).

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 208.

¹³ H. Israil et al., "Dinamika Pluralisme Agama di Nusa Tenggara Barat", *Jurnal Penelitian Keislaman*, vol. 1, no. 1 (2000), pp. 1–16.

village were observing the *selakaran* tradition and using a loud speaker.¹⁴ It was held to welcome their village fellows coming back from performing hajj in Mecca.¹⁵ The loud speaker offended the Hindus, who needed tranquility, solemnity and abstinence from any electronic uses during the observance of the *Nyepi*. Conflict was about to happen between these two different religious neighboring communities. Fortunately, the conflict was immediately resolved and hence it did not escalate into an open conflict.

The tension between the Hindu community in Tohpati and the Muslim community in Karang Mas-Mas, who live adjacently, reappeared at the end of 2012. This communal conflict was triggered by the fight between young people in both kampongs on 19 December 2012.¹⁶ There were different stories about causes and chronology of the conflict causing one casualty and several injured victims. It is said that the conflict was triggered by a drunken youth from Tohpati passing through Karang Mas-Mas. He was then reproved by some youths from Karang Mas-Mas. The drunken youth then was evicted from the area of Karang Mas-Mas and chased until Tohpati. Friends of the drunken youth objected the behavior of Karang Mas-Mas youths and attacked Karang Mas-Mas youths. As a result, Sulaiman, a youth from Karang Mas-Mas was stabbed and killed. Aftermath, two houses of Hindu in Tohpati were burnt down.

An officer of the Mataram Police Department narrated the second version of story. He stated that the conflict was triggered by Sulaiman, a youth of Karang Mas-Mas passing through a huddle of drunken youths in Tohpati. Sulaiman riding a motorbike was mocked by a drunken youth. Sulaiman felt irritated and called his friends from Karang Mas-Mas. A fight between Karang Mas-Mas youths and Tohpati youths occurred afterwards. Sulaiman was stabbed and killed. According to AKBP Kurnianto Purwoko, the head of Mataram Police Department, after the incident, the conflict escalated, causing one house burnt and injuring three people in Tohpati community on 20 December 2012.¹⁷

The situation in two kampongs, Tohpati and Karang Mas-Mas, were gradually under the control. The people from both communities refrained themselves from committing violence and continued their

¹⁴ *Selakaran* is recitation of *salawat*. Lombok Muslims frequently perform *Selakaran* in certain moments such as *kurisan* (the first hair cut for babies), circumcision, delivering and welcoming the pilgrims. .

¹⁵ See Israil et al., "Dinamika Pluralisme Agama", p. 11. .

¹⁶ "Bentrokan antar Pemuda, Satu Tewas", *Lombok Post* (Bali, 20 Dec 2012).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

daily activities peacefully. Nonetheless, a violent conflict recurred three months afterwards on 7 March 2013. The conflict caused one casualty; I Made Ardiyana (45 years old), a Hindu from Tohpati, North Cakranegara, Mataram was killed. Ardiyana is an older brother of a person who stabbed Sulaiman.¹⁸ Those two conflicts between the Tohpati Hindu community and the Karang Mas-Mas Muslim community related each other. In my view, Karang Mas-Mas Muslim community revenged for the death of one of their members. The head of Human Relation Division of NTB Police Department, AKBP Sukarman Husein, stated that the second conflict on 7 March 2013 was a repercussion of the first conflict that occurred on 19 December 2012.¹⁹

2. *Conflict between Nyangget vis-à-vis Saksari*

In 2001, tension between Nyangget Muslim community and Saksari Hindu community broke out. These kampongs are located in the east of Karang Taliwang, northern Mataram. That was the first conflict. Following this, conflicts often reoccur that usually involve drunken youths. To prevent the escalation of the conflict, the municipality Mataram government has built a wall separating these two conflicting kampongs. The wall, two meters in high, deter the people of these two conflicting neighboring kampongs from encountering one another on an alley that separates the kampongs. If one needs to enter into these two kampongs, she or he has to pass through another road. An Arabic word *Allāh Akbar* is written on the gate of the separating wall.²⁰ The same word is also written on the walls of some Muslims' houses outside included those located in the area of Hindu Saksari.

In spite of the wall separating two kampongs, conflict remains unavoidable. The last conflict occurred in 2008. This conflict involved a great number of people from two communities. The conflict injured several people and killed one Muslim from Nyangget.²¹ According to

¹⁸ "Polisi Sita Bom Molotov pada Konflik Antarkampung di Mataram", *ANTARANTB.com* (8 Mar 2013), <http://www.antaranb.com/print/24287/polisi-sita-bom-molotov-pada-konflik-antarkampung-di-mataram>, accessed 3 Sep 2013.

¹⁹ "Di Mataram Konflik Antarkampung, Made Ardiyana Tewas", *BALIPOST.co.id* (3 Sep 2013), <http://www.balipost.co.id/mediadetail.php?module=detailberita&kid=33&id=74540>, accessed 3 Sep 2013.

²⁰ Observation in July 2011.

²¹ The police reported that one was killed and three people were injured in the conflict; <http://www.komisikepolisianindonesia.com/second> (accessed on 12 September 2011).

Syahri, the conflict was started when his son, Zul, rode a motorbike and passed through Saksari Kampong. Saksari youths accused him of hitting one member of Saksari kampong.²² The Saksari youths chased him, whom in turn reported the incident to his father and the kampong head. Being offended, Zul's father and a number of Nyangget people searched for the youths in Saksari Kampong who humiliated Zul. The unilateral decision of Nyangget people stimulated hatred of the Saksari people. As a result, fight between the members of two kampongs broke out. They even agreed to wage a greater war, called *mesiat* in Sasak language, held in a rice field near a temple.²³ A violent fight happened there. "Unfortunately, we were defeated at that fight. I don't know why they brought a lot of air rifles. Many of us were injured. They won. We were defeated because we brought only cleavers and machetes", said Amak Miran of Nyangget recalling the incident occurred several years ago.²⁴

3. *Conflicts between Karang Tapen, Karang Jasi and Karang Lelede*

Another recurring conflict is involved Karang Tapen Muslim community and Karang Jasi Hindu community and Karang Tapen Muslim community and Karang Lelede Hindu community. Those communities live behind Mataram Mall and are adjacent to each other. They are only separated by a narrow road and an intersection. Karang Tapen Muslim kampong is located in the west while Hindu kampongs of Karang Lelede and Karang Jasi are located in the east. The intersection turned into a battle arena and a silent witness of mass riots.²⁵

A riot in 2001 was initially triggered by a slight crash between two motorbikes of a Hindu driver and a Muslim driver in Sekarbela, two kilometers from Karang Tapen and Karang Jasi. Two people then

²² The community of Saksari dan Tohpati has different stories about the conflict. According to Ida and Wayan, the community leaders of Saksari, the conflict was triggered by an incident afflicting Zul, a youth from Nyangget. Zul riding a motorbike fell in the Saksari road. The motorbike was belonging to Zul's uncle. Because Zul was afraid that his uncle would be angry with him, he made up a story that he was hit by Saksari youths. Consequently, the Nyangget community came to Saksari and fought with them. Ida Bagus, interview (9 Sep 2011); Wayan Wiratha, interview (22 Mar 2012).

²³ The fight area is usually called Telaga Gede. When I visited this site, there was a simple Hindu temple. According to Saksari Hindus, fights frequently happen in that area because the Hindus have not immediately renovated the temple.

²⁴ Amak Miran, interview (9 Oct 2011).

²⁵ "Dua Kampung Di-"Sweeping", Tujuh Warga Diamankan, Puluhan Sajam Disita", *Bali Post* (Bali, 14 Sep 2005), <http://www.balipost.co.id/balipostcetak/2005/9/14/nusatenggara.html>, accessed 6 Dec 2011.

quarreled and fought. The person from Sekarbela felt recessive thus he asked help from the Karang Tapen community. The rumor about Hindus attacked a Muslim spread. Consequently, support and solidarity from the Karang Tapen Muslim community appeared. Afterwards, Karang Tapen youths gathered in Palapa Road separating two settlements of Karang Jasi and Karang Tapen. At that time, a young person from Gerung, West Lombok living in Karang Jasi came to Karang Tapen youths, who were gathering. Without knowing about the occurring case, he asked the gathering youths. Suddenly, one of the youths stabbed the Hindu from Gerung. He was injured and sent to Mataram Hospital.

Hearing that incident, the victim's family was angry and came to Karang Jasi to seek clarification and responsibility for what the people there had done. While they were gathering in Karang Jasi, suddenly somebody threw a stone towards the Karang Tapen Muslim settlement. A rumor that the communities of Karang Jasi and Karang Lelede united to attack the Karang Tapen community spread fast. The situation turned to be more critical and the tension intensified when the sound of *kul-kul bulus* (a kind of clappers) was heard in Karang Jasi and Karang Lelede. For Balinese, *kul kul bulus* sound has a clear message; it is a sign of danger.²⁶ People from Karang Jasi and Karang Lelede gathered and were ready for any unpredictable conditions such as attacks from Karang Tapen. The youths gathered bringing their machetes, cleavers, air riffles and stones as if they were about to war. Similarly, the situation in Karang Tapen was critical. The exclamation of *Allāh Akbar* through a mosque's loudspeaker reverberated across the kampong, warning all Karang Tapen people that a war was about to happen. Karang Tapen people particularly the youths brought spears, swords, cleavers and stones. Two angry mobs met and fought. They threw stones and Molotov towards each other. Many were injured. Several Muslims' and Hindus' houses around the site of conflict were burn down.

Religious identity and symbol often emerge in every conflict and replace ethnic identity. In peaceful situation, Sasak people call Hindu Balinese as Balinese. During a conflict, Balinese are called Hindus. *Kul-kul bulus* sound is replied by the exclamation of *takbir* in a mosque tower. This

²⁶ Tim Puslitbang Kehidupan Beragama, *Pemetaan Kerukunan Kehidupan Beragama di Nusa Tenggara Barat* (Jakarta: Badan Litbang dan Diklat, 2006), pp. 1–23, <http://balitbangdiklat.kemenag.go.id/konten-download/konten-hasil-penelitian/konten-kehidupan-beragama/pemetaan-kerukunan-kehidupan-beragama-di-nusa-tenggara-barat.html>, accessed 10 Feb 2012.

phenomenon frequently happens and shows a clear boundary between ethnicity and religiosity. People are classified according to their religious identities and symbols. Referring Lewis Coser, tensions may stimulate the raise of a group's internal solidarity. Every group takes efforts to skill themselves and intensifies communication among them. Expressing a group's superiority over the other raises the group's pride.

4. *Temple Destruction and Rejection*

Another tension that has interrupted peaceful relationships between Hindus and Muslims was destruction of a Hindu temple at Tuesday night on 15 January 2008. Hundreds of people attacked, destroyed, and burnt Sangkareang Temple in Keru, Narmada, West Lombok.²⁷ They argued that the temple was built illegally without the government's permit, as this is required. As a result, angry Muslims burnt it.

Widy, the secretary of Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia/PHDI in NTB, stated that beside Sangkareang Temple, several other temples in Pusuk West Lombok and near East Lombok port were destroyed.²⁸ The destruction was particularly due to the absence of temple *pengempon* (superintendents) and lack of Hindu community living nearby. Such temples are vulnerable of being object of vandalism and destruction. Mataram also recorded rejection of Hindu temple. Gubuk Mamben community in Sekarbela protested the superintendent of Dalem Temple in Saren. According to Tahmid Syafi'i, the head of Gubuk Mamben kampung, the temple was previously a Hindu cemetery but was replaced with a new building of temple without community's prior consent. Many Hindus from other places also regularly visited the new temple, rendering inconvenient for local Muslim community.²⁹ Fortunately, the protest did not trigger conflict.

²⁷ This temple was built several hundreds years ago (approximately in 1680s) and renovated several times. In 2006, the Hindus living surrounding the temple renovated it and planned to perform *Piodalan/Pujawali* in the full moon on 22 January 2008. Nevertheless, the Muslim attack destructed the temple, which was almost completely renovated on 15 January 2008. The managers of NTB PHDI wrote a report of destruction chronology signed by its head (dr. IK Gerudug, M.P.H) and secretary (Dr. Ir. KG Wiryawan, M.Ag). The head of KMHDI in Jakarta criticized the temple destruction through a media broadcast and asked the government to penalize the temple destroyers and to provide security for the Hindus. It was cited from a media broadcast about the statement on the destruction of Sangkareang Temple in Lombok on 17 January 2008.

²⁸ Widy, interview (24 Mar 2012).

²⁹ Tahmid Syafi'i, interview (29 Mar 2012).

In the celebration of Islamic New Year on 1 Muharram 1433 H or 27 November 2011, the Muslim Gubuk Mamben community explicitly proposed a written protest against Dalem temple. The protest signed by 75 people and community leaders. The protest brought four important points: (1) Muslim brotherhood should be strengthened; (2) the government programs on religious tolerance should be supported; (3) referring to the Joint Decree of the Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minister of Internal Affairs Number 8 and 9/2006 respectively, the Muslim community rejected Dalem temple because it was erected amidst the Muslim community settlement; (4) the Mataram government should demolish any house of worship built without abiding by the regulation and the Mataram government should require the Hindus in Saren to return Dalem temple into its previous function as a cemetery.³⁰

I Wayan Wiratha as a *banjar* (hamlet association) administrator also questioned the Muslims' protest; "I wonder why they protested against this temple because it has been established for very long time. The temple was built in 1802. Why did they protest referring to a recent regulation?" Hatta, an officer from the NTB Police Department, expressed a different explanation. He said that the Muslim community protested after the Hindus prohibited Muslim children from playing football in the temple's yard and forbade Muslims' horses used for buggies from eating grass there.³¹ Commenting this issue, Tahmid, one of Gubuk Mamben community leaders, felt irritated when the temple superintendent reprimanded Muslim children playing football outside the temple area. "In the past, Hindu Saren people were used to ask our help to cut their banana trees or harvest their mangos. But, now they even prohibited us to take grass near their areas."³²

It seems that tensions and conflicts between the Gubuk Mamben community and the Saren community have roots in their long relationship. In my view, the conflict relates to two aspects. *First*, there was a lack of communication between the Gubuk Mamben community and the Saren community; both were used to build good communication and close relationship. *Second*, there is a lack of public spaces where both different ethnic and religious groups spend time for meeting and having conversation. In the past, all Muslim and Hindu children played football and games together in the temple area. Furthermore, Muslims' horses ate

³⁰ "Deklarasi 1 Muharam 1433 H", pamphlet by Community of East Sekarbela.

³¹ Hatta, an Officer of the NTB Police Department, interview (24 Mar 2012).

³² Syafi'i, interview (29 Mar 2012).

grass freely there. However, when the temple superintendents built a wall surrounding the temple for security and cleanliness reasons, a public space in the temple area was cut off. The Hindus also did not communicate the wall building to the Muslim community who claimed that the area surrounding the temple was a shared public space. In contrast, the Hindu Saren community asserted that the temple has existed in that area for very long time and they had a certificate of land ownership. Unfortunately, the Mataram government was slow in responding the issue. The government should have provided public spaces for the people. The government should greatly consider people's need for public spaces in urban planning. Ideally, urban planning should not emphasize only the development of business centers, but also the provision of public spaces for all people.

C. The Pattern of Conflict Resolution

Generally, the Mataram government officials intervened conflicts and tensions by stopping them. When a conflict occurs, the first procedure is to restore the situation by deploying the police conflict sites. When situation gets worse, they are supported by the Indonesian National Army. Such conflict management is included in the phase of peacekeeping. In intervening tension between the Karang Tapen Muslim community and Hindu communities from Karang Jasi and Karang Lelede in 2002, for example, 150 police were sent to the intersection at Karang Lelede Market in order to prevent a more severe conflict. This procedure was taken to stop physical fights between those two conflicting communities.³³ For a couple of days, a number of Indonesian armies also got involved in peacekeeping process in that conflict site next to the Mataram mall.

In many cases, the law is not really enforced. The police do not completely arrest conflict instigators. This is partly because the police find it difficult to determine key actors behind large-scale conflicts. For example, the police could not arrest the actors behind the conflicts in Karang Taliwang, Karang Tapen, Sindu and Sangkareang temple in Narmada because they did not find any evidence. Moreover, the conflicting parties forced the police to release the suspect who had been arrested for interrogation. Such factors frequently reduce the effectiveness of conflict termination. Strong communal sense also causes another

³³ "Perkelahian Antarkampung di Mataram, Dua Warga Cedera", *LIPUTAN6.com* (5 Jun 2002), <http://news.liputan6.com/read/33667/perkelahian-antarkampung-di-mataram-dua-warga-cedera>, accessed 17 Jul 2011.

problem. When a person is suspected and arrested, his or her fellows will defend him or her. In the case of Sangkareang temple, for instance, the police could not capture the offenders, who destroyed and burnt it, to the court because of communal solidarity from their village fellows. This triggered protest involving more than 500 students against the slow police's performance.

Therefore, the local government anticipates potential conflicts by building security facilities such as police stations and separating walls between the conflicting areas. The police stations were built in potentially conflicting areas such as Tohpati, Karang Tapen and Karang Lelede, whilst the two-meter high wall was built, separating Nyangget and Saksari kampongs. Such a wall was also erected in Pagutan, Mataram, separating two conflicting kampongs of Karang Genteng and Petemon.³⁴

However, the separating wall seems to be counterproductive for social integration. It may reduce riots, but it reduces social interactions, which could hasten integration and reconciliation. Indeed, group solidarity appears and strengthens communalism. Communalism grows increasingly in those villages separated by such a wall. In other words, the segregation of conflicting communities causes more destructive conflict in the future. Instead of building a separating wall, it is better to build public spaces such as sports facilities, parks, markets, schools and cultural centers that enable different communities to interact freely and positively.

After the riots had abated and the peace could be established, the government invited conflicting parties into dialogue in a neutral place such as in the village hall and the Mataram mayor's office. Religious leaders such as *tuan guru* from the Muslim community and *pedanda* from the Hindu community and Indonesian Hindusim Society participated in this forum. Peace agreement was finally reached. This step can be referred as the phase of peace making. When representatives of both parties signed the peace agreement, the dispute was considered to have been resolved. The local government declared that the conflict between two kampongs was over. The security forces also stated that the conditions were conducive and safe. Furthermore, people were encouraged to be calm down.

When conflicting parties think that the conflict is over, they do not take necessary step to prevent it from happening in the future. Reconciliation process is not implemented. In fact, peace building

³⁴ "Rentetan Amuk di Pulau Lombok", *KORANTEMPO.com* (1 Mar 2004), <http://www.infoanda.com/followlink.php?lh=VVAFBVwFVFtR>, accessed 31 Jan 2004. *Al-Jāmi'ah*, Vol. 53, No. 1, 2015 M/1436 H

should be taken. Unfortunately, the Mataram government has not developed programs of sustainable peace building. Conflict termination does not necessarily mean that there will be no subsequent conflict. For example, a number of police were sent back to Tohpati and Karang Mas-Mas on 19 December 2012 just a few days after the conflicting parties agreed to end the conflict. This was because subsequent tension between the members of these two kampongs occurred on 7 March 2013.³⁵ Despite peace agreement between conflicting parties, conflict recurrence shows that the government should take further efforts in peace building that empowers communities to establish strong kinship and solidarity. If this step were taken, it could prevent a likelihood of conflict in the future, which might take in different form.

From the above description, it can be said that the conflict resolution taken by the Mataram government has been limited only to peacekeeping and peace making; they have not developed sustainable peace building. Conflict confinement and termination are not sufficient for long-term conflict management. Communication, cooperation and mutual respect between different ethnic and religious communities should be established. Conflict prevention can be advanced when the government and the people have awareness to develop a social early warning system.

D. Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

Louis Kriesberg as quoted by Samsu Rizal Panggabean and Ihsan Ali-Fauzi states that conflict may occur and end up destructively or constructively. A conflict may turn into either an intractable violent conflict or a positive and constructive thing. In order to stop conflict constructively, Kriesberg suggests three mechanisms: intragroup mechanism, intergroup mechanism and extra mechanism.³⁶ We will examine the roles played by religious leaders (*tuan gurus* and *pedandas*) in these three mechanisms and compare their roles in addressing the conflict.

1. Internal Mechanisms within Religious and Ethnic Community

Internal mechanisms are applied within a religious or ethnic

³⁵ The conflict chronology can be read in “Polisi Sita Bom Molotov”; “Di Mataram Konflik Antarkampung”.

³⁶ Syamsu Rizal Panggabean and Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, “Dari Riset Perang ke Riset Bina Damai”, in *Polisi, Masyarakat dan Konflik Keagamaan di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina, 2011), p. 190.

community. It has been assumed that a religious or ethnic group has creative internal efforts in exploring and utilizing their power and resources in conflict management. The resources include normative religious values and customs as well as religious and community leaders. Those leaders such as *tuan gurus* and *pedandas* (in a limited role) actively promote religious values and local wisdom that encourage social cohesion and integration. Empathy and forgiveness are two concepts that are often used to establish harmonious social relations. Social punishment is imposed to instigators of conflict.

When a conflict is over, the local government usually designates *tuan guru* and *pedanda* to help restore the situation. During a conflict, they strive to relieve the people's tension, arbitrate conflicting parties and encouraging them to terminate violence. Calls for peace and harmony are delivered in Islamic learning forums within the Muslim community and *dharma* discourses within the Hindu community. At critical moments, they use a mosque's loudspeaker in the mosque to suggest the community members to restrain themselves and stop violence. The elderly people then forward the suggestions to their families. Each family advises their adult children to interact peacefully with the circumstance and neighborhood and to maintain the order. The same messages are usually conveyed by parents to their children so they will avoid hindering social interaction.

In the course of conflict, *tuan guru* and *pedanda* usually take active participation to appease their community. They convey a message that any conflict has no root in religion. Nor creating conflict is acceptable in any religious teaching. Besides, they also spread peace message to avoid the complication of conflict because once a conflict spreads there is hardly any prompt mechanism to halt it. Calls for self-restraint and mutual respect are generally accepted. Non-religious nature of conflict makes it manageable for the society. The case of temple destruction or refusal is due more to misunderstanding and miscommunication between Muslim and Hindu youths than other causes.

To limit conflict, religious and community leaders declare that it does not relate either to religion or ethnicity. Drs. L. Wildan (one of the famous *tuan guru* in Mataram), H. Badrun (the head of Religious Affairs Office of Mataram), and the officials of PHDI members and lecturers of STAHN Gede Puja Mataram agreed to state that the conflict between communities of Karang Tapen and Karang Jasi was merely a

fight between youths.³⁷ Relating the conflict only to youth fights, drunken young people, violent theft or individual action are a relatively effective simplification to confine the conflict immediately. Therefore, it is expected that internal group solidarity does not emerge. If the issue of religious nature of conflict is spread, it extends and raises great supports from religious communities in other regions.

“Conflict simplification” to some extent is necessary because even a slight provocation may exacerbate it. Almost all community and religious leaders I met stated that conflicts between Karang Tapen and Karang Jasi, Nyangget and Saksari, as well as Karang Taliwang and Sindu were merely youth fights. “It was children involved in conflict. Yes, if Made (Hindu) is wrong, he is convicted. Similarly, if Ali (Muslim) is wrong, Ali is convicted. Not all the community members get engaged in it,” said Pedanda Gusti Lanang Jeber, the chairman of PHDI Cakranegara. Djalaludin Arzaki, also confirmed that in Lombok tradition, most conflicts involving Hindus and Muslims were youth conflict. “Those who like to drink alcohol and play gambling are most likely to make trouble,” said Arzaki.³⁸

Community and religious leaders argue that neither religious nor ethnic differences trigger conflict. Commotion is triggered by youth fights, which eventually provoke group solidarity. Another reason is that the Balinese people have lived next door to the Sasaks for a long time. In fact, in a workshop held by a non-government organization in Mataram in cooperation with an NGO from Jakarta, it was revealed that in general, religious-based conflicts do not exist in Mataram.³⁹

Indeed, before a communal fight between the Muslim community in Karang Tapen and the Hindu community in Karang Jasi and Karang Lelede had occurred, exclamation of *takbīr* was heard repeatedly from the mosque in Karang Tapen and the sound of *kul-kul bulus* was

³⁷ Interview on 20, 21 and 23 March 2012.

³⁸ Arzaki argued that violent conflict is caused by four *ekek* (dirty actions disturbing society), which are *nyadek* (drinking alcohol), *gocek* (gambling/cock -fighting gambling), *ngubek* (prostitution) and *dredge* (theft). Djalaludin Arzaki, interview (25 Aug 2011).

³⁹ LeNSA NTB, a non-government organization in Mataram, in collaboration with Kapal Perempuan from Jakarta held a workshop on conflict mapping through peace card. In the workshop attended by representatives from interfaith religious leaders, it was found that conflict in Mataram does not relate to ethnicities. Most participants did not view conflict in Mataram involving different religious communities as interreligious conflict.

heard in Karang Jasi and Karang Lelede. Moreover, the phrase “*Allāh Akbar*” was obviously written in the wall separating Nyangget and Saksari kampongs. All indicate the presentation of religious symbols in communal conflict. However, community and religious leaders argued that the conflict should not be considered religious in order to confine it. Such tension confinement seems to be an internal mechanism prevailing in every community.

In Bali Bombing 1 and 2, the offenders were Muslim hardliners. At that time, a rumor that Balinese would sweep Muslims was spread. Women wearing hijab got unfavorable treatment. Interpersonal mistrust was also very high. Such rumor soon spread in Lombok. Some Sasaks claimed that if the Balinese swept and expelled Muslims, they would do the same to Balinese in Lombok. Responding to the situation, Hindu and Muslim leaders advised and informed that what happened in Bali was not a religious war, rather an action of some narrow-minded Muslim hardliners who actually destroyed the image of Islam. Consequently, the situation did not deteriorate and the tension diminished. The religious leaders genuinely developed an internal mechanism in conflict resolution.

Conflict issue simplification in this situation is highly effective in reducing tension, but it has several fallacies. In the long term, such simplification may distract people from real substantial problems. That conflict is considered merely youth fight and has nothing to do with ethnicity or religion obscures one of the roots of conflict; it is important to find roots or underlying causes of conflict.⁴⁰

Another internal mechanism of conflict resolution is establishment of agreements or customary regulations. The Sasak community has developed an internal resolution mechanism, which is called *awik-awik*, a traditional rule agreed upon by all community members.⁴¹ For

⁴⁰ Georg Frerks and Bart Klem (eds.), *Dealing with Diversity, Sri Lankan Discourses on Peace and Conflict* (Netherlands: Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael”, 2005); Leo Howe, “Hinduism, Identity, and Social Conflict: The Sai Baba Movement in Bali”, in *Hinduism in Modern Indonesia: Between Local, National, and Global Interests*, ed. by Martin Ramstedt (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004), pp. 264–80. About the ethnic conflict in the contemporary world, see Aḥmad Wabhān, *al-Širā’āt al-‘irqiyah wa-istiqrār al-‘ālam al-mu’āṣir: dirāsah fī al-aqalliyāt wa-al-jamā’āt wa-al-ḥarakāt al-‘irqiyah* (al-Iskandarīyah: Dār al-Jāmi’ah al-Jadīdah lil-Nashr, 1997).

⁴¹ *Awik-awik* seems to be effective in keeping public peace. In the last few years, the local government has actively encouraged *awik-awik* revitalization in villages across Lombok; “Lombok Timur Fasilitas Desa Buat Awik-Awik”, *ANTARANTB.com* (25 Dec 2010), <http://www.antarantb.com/berita/14382/lombok-timur-fasilitas-Al-Jāmi’ah>, Vol. 53, No. 1, 2015 M/1436 H

example, *awik-awik* imposes social sanctions on thieves, adultery perpetrators and other wrongdoers. The social sanctions include fine and expulsion. In the past, *awik-awik* was very important because it served a quasi-legal norm effective to keep social order. In everyday social relations, all community members have to obey *awik-awik* including simple interpersonal relationships. For example, there is *awik-awik* on *midang* (dating) for youths in order to prevent promiscuity and permissive attitudes. Masykuri discloses that community leaders assert that if a young man is going to visit his girlfriend's house, a woman, who has got married and not a widow, must accompany her. Masykuri explains further that that is because a married woman has sufficient knowledge and experience in this matter and a widow is likely to attract the man's attention.⁴²

Most *awik-awik* organizes and binds society internally. The Hindu community also has established customary rules. *Pedanda* and the head of kampong (kepala lingkungan) initiate the establishment of community rules imposed to all community members. *Pedanda* has big influence in implementing *awik-awik*. Besides regulating social relations, *awik-awik* in the Hindu community regulates the implementation of religious ceremonies. Mangku Sutarma, *Pedanda* in Mataram explained,

“A person who does not obey these rules will be fined. Those community members who live in remote areas will also be fined if they do not attend religious ceremonies. The rules prohibit community members from committing despicable acts. If they violate such rules, they will be sanctioned or excluded from the community membership.”⁴³

2. *Interreligious and Interethnic Mechanisms*

Interreligious and interethnic conflict resolution mechanisms go through two paths: formal and informal. Formal interfaith and interethnic associations include the Interreligious Peace Forum, the Bali-Sasak Association and the Communication Forum of Youth Unity. During conflicts like the conflict between Karang Tapen, Karang Jasi and Karang Lelede; or the riot between Nyangget and Saksari, religious leaders met to discuss the conflict and to figure out solution. *Tuan guru* from the Muslim community, *pedanda* or the board of directors of PHDI from the Hindu community and youth representatives were invited in a *desa-buat-awik-awik*, accessed 10 Feb 2012.

⁴² Masykuri, interview (14 Nov 2012).

⁴³ interview with the Head of Karang Jasi (26 Aug 2011).

dialogue in order to resolve tensions and conflict causes. Such moment was critical. If religious leaders failed in reaching an agreement, conflict or unrest would likely re-occur. Dialogue and negotiation were carried in hard time during those conflicts. Each group defended their arguments. However, the two conflicting parties began to realize and led to mutual forgiveness. H. Musleh, *tuan guru* in Karang Tapen, revealed, “We are actually embarrassed by this conflict. Our grandparents taught us to respect our neighbors even though we are different. We used to help a Balinese who needed help. They also often came to our feast. The conflict was just a misunderstanding.”⁴⁴

An alternative way in reducing tension between two conflicting communities is taken by religious leaders. Some *tuan gurus* and *pedandas* agree to establish good and intensive communication and interaction. Improving communication is a good way in reducing tension. Poor communication between youths in Karang Tapen, Karang Jasi and Karang Lelede is one cause of weakening inter-group relations. In such situation, negative rumors often cannot be managed appropriately. In fact, relationship between youths can be established through shared sport activities. Tuan Guru Haji Musleh recalled his experience when he was a teenager. “In the past, we played football with our Balinese friends. We also joined martial arts called Bela Diri Kala Putih.”⁴⁵ Involvement of young Muslims and Hindus in sport groups like soccer and martial arts plays an important role not only in directing younger generation into positive activities, but also in building effective communication for mutual understanding.

In fact, concerning the conflict between Karang Tapen and Karang Jasi, some people proposed a good idea for improving communication among youths. Saharuddin, a Karang Tapen mosque activist, proposed some competitions or games in Indonesian Independence Day celebration, which would involve youths from two kampongs. The competitions included tug of war and volleyball that engaged cross-ethnic sport groups whose members were the Hindu-Balinese and the Muslim-Sasaks. A number of *tuan gurus* and *pedandas* appreciate on those programs.

Pertaining to the efforts in improving mutual and intensive communication, religious leaders were willing to become members of Interreligious Peace Forum (*Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama*/FKUB.

⁴⁴ H. Musleh, interview (30 Jul 2011).

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

It is a unique association of cross-religious groups. In one hand, it is established and funded by the state and hence the state's interest in it may be salient. On the contrary, it can become an independent organization that develops its own interests and objectives. FKUB's social standing is important because it represents various religious groups. FKUB has a strategic position as a means of organizing representatives from various religious communities. FKUB is different from MUI, Walubi, PHDI or PGI since these are representation of one religion or community. In Varshney's perspective,⁴⁶ association such as FKUB is one of inter-communal association potentially decreases tension between interreligious communities. In Putnam's view,⁴⁷ FKUB plays a significant role in bridging plural religious communities. FKUB can be a catalyst and supporter for the government in building interreligious harmony. The forum can mediate various problems in interreligious conflicts.

To strengthen social and religious harmony, religious leaders remind their people of realizing local wisdom and mutual respect. Reciprocity and mutual respect in peace building are represented in various local traditions such as *salingjoting* (mutual food exchange), *saling besilak* (reciprocal invitation and help in traditional feast) and *saling pelimat* (reciprocal visit of condolence). These traditions form social bonding and strengthen social cohesion.⁴⁸ Reciprocity does not take place internally only in the Muslim-Sasak community, but also expands across other religious and ethnic groups. TGH Mukhtar, for example, said, "We need to practice *saling besilak*, *saling ayoin*, *saling pelangarin*, *saling pelimat*, so that people in Lombok can live in harmony and help each other."⁴⁹ By practicing this tradition, civic engagement among different ethnic and religious communities can be developed. Referring to Varshney, such mechanism is part of quotidian social bonding.⁵⁰

3. *Extra Mechanisms of Conflict Resolution*

The extra mechanism came from outside the community and

⁴⁶ Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life*, p. 12.

⁴⁷ Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Y. Nanetti, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

⁴⁸ Study about internal social bonding and social bridging can be read in Deepa Narayan, "Bonds and Bridges: Social Capital and Poverty", in *Social Capital and Economic Development: Well-being in Developing Countries*, ed. by Jonathan Isham, Thomas Kelly, and Sunder Ramaswamy (Cheltenham, UK1: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2002).

⁴⁹ Interview in August 2012.

⁵⁰ Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life*, p. 12.

engaged interstate resolution. The most important characteristic of extra mechanism was fair treatment. All community members regardless of their religious and ethnic backgrounds received fair treatment and protection as long as they obeyed state regulations such as paying tax and maintaining public order.⁵¹ Extra mechanisms have been established in Mataram with some modifications from the original concept developed by Louis Kriesberg.

The Mataram government has implemented extra mechanisms. For example, all religious communities get equal treatment and services. Dissemination of religious teaching and observances can be performed in peace. The provincial and municipal governments have contributed proactively in sponsoring Hindu and Muslim religious activities such as *Seleksi Tilawatil Qur'an* (STQ) and *Utsawa Dharma Gita* (UDG). The government also has provided financial supports for the Hindu and Muslim communities who organize various activities and establish houses of worship. Although the fund is small, it shows the government's attention to religious communities' existence.

However, there are some complaints against lack of respect from the majority Muslims. Widy, a Hindu activist, said, "We feel uncomfortable with the fact that many young Muslims disrespect our traditions. In fact, we really appreciate Islamic traditions. For example, when we bring a corpse to the cremation place, the gamelan is played along with the procession. When we pass through a Muslim village, we are often reprimanded. Conversely, we never complain when Muslim brothers use a loudspeaker at any time in a mosque. We do cremation mostly once a year. So, please understand."⁵² The Hindus also find difficulties in throwing ashes of cremated bodies into rivers or sea. Moreover, the Hindus criticize school curriculum that excludes pagan religions. They expect that schools should enhance religiosity of all students without any exception and develop religious tolerance. Contents of religious education should not stigmatize any religion.

The government also should enhance regulation in regard to dissemination of religious teachings. Indeed, the Mataram government issued regulations on the implementation of religious ceremonies such as the venue for religious activities involving a great number of people and the use of loudspeaker at certain hours in the evening. That seems simple regulation; otherwise friction may appear. For instance, the use

⁵¹ Panggabean and Ali-Fauzi, "Dari Riset Perang", p. 195.

⁵² Widy, interview (24 Mar 2012).

of loudspeakers in religious activities sometimes causes tension. One of PHDI administrators stated, «When we are doing our prayer or reading the Vedas, we sometimes are protested. Though, we do it only once a month. Muslims perform their prayers every day even until late night and use loudspeakers, but we never complain about that.»⁵³ On the other hand, most Muslims view that the minority Hindus should respect and appreciate the culture and beliefs of the majority.

Regarding such issue, the government's role is crucial. They should be fair and neutral in bridging diversities and tensions. Extra mechanisms become important when two religious communities persist in their own views. The government's role in extra mechanisms of conflict resolution can be seen, for example, in the successful mediation between Muslims and Hindus around the Lingsar temple promoted by the official of Lingsar District of West Lombok. According to Dani, tension occurred a few days before the parade of *ogoh-ogoh* in 2012. A Hindu police who was appointed as the parade event organizer proposed a permit to the local village head, but it was rejected. The village chief argued that the community rejected the *ogoh-ogoh* parade because of an issue that the Hindus in Bali Island prohibited Muslims to perform Friday prayer, which is performed loudly, in the *Nyepi* day that requires silence. He then applied for permission to the sub-district government of Lingsar, but it was also rejected. He also got rejection from the district government of West Lombok. Moreover, the Muslim community members put up signs declaring the ban of *ogoh-ogoh* parade in Lingsar. Fortunately, those warning signs did not provoke the Hindus because on Thursday, 22 March 2012, the Lingsar police removed the warning signs put in the road entrance to the Lingsar temple.

Muslim community rejected the *ogoh-ogoh* parade because it had not been performed before in Lingsar, but in Mataram. Supaman stated, «Actually, the Muslims did not question religious activities such as prayers or parades. But, we objected to hold an activity that has never been performed here before. There has been no *ogoh-ogoh* parade.»⁵⁴ Some Muslim leaders also objected the *ogoh-ogoh* parade as many youths drink alcohol while they are carrying *ogoh-ogoh* and this may cause riots.

PHDI of NTB immediately intervened the problem. They facilitated a meeting for Muslim and Hindu to discuss the issue. Finally, it was decided that the Hindu community would not hold the *ogoh-ogoh*

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ Supaman, interview (23 Mar 2012).

parade in Lingsar, they would join that in Mataram. Extra mechanisms that involve interstate resolution have not been applied in Mataram because the Hindu-Muslim conflicts were relatively small. The conflict could be mitigated by agents of peace at the local level. This also can be seen as the result of community leaders' hard work in confining the conflict issue.

E. Concluding Remarks

Tuan guru dan *pedanda* played an important role in conflict resolution in Lombok. Their roles can be seen in a number of ways and mechanism. In internal mechanism within religious and ethnic community, they tried to create conditions of peace and quiet in their respective communities. They conveyed religious messages containing peace and harmony. In addition, these religious leaders also built opinion that the conflict had nothing to do with religious matters. This aimed at limiting any potentials of conflict escalation so preventing it from spreading. In the interreligious and interethnic mechanisms, religious leaders were involved actively in interfaith dialogues and they joined the FKUB. Nevertheless, there are some distinct characters between *tuan guru* and *pedanda*. Among his followers, the *tuan guru*'s role was larger and stronger than those of *pedanda*. *Tuan guru* held a greater authority. The role of *tuan guru* not only covered religious matters but also social issues, politics, and culture. However, *pedande*'s authority was confined to religious matters.

To highlight the point, the role taken by religious leader was significant as communities' obedience to them was high. Furthermore, their role was increasingly important particularly when there was lack of trust in the state's role. This finding, as such, supports the previous study conducted by Jeremy Kinsley⁵⁵ stating that *tuan gurus* held a significant role as peace makers. Correspondingly, Paul Lederach asserted that involvement of actors from non- state agency was inevitable especially when the state gained too little trust from the community.

The significance of religious and community leaders' role in conflict resolution allowed the governments to increasingly develop a relationship with them. In other words, communities' obedience to religious leaders encouraged the local government to involve them as much as possible in conflict resolution from campaigning religious values for peace building, confining negative issues during and after conflict, restraining people from prejudice and hate to other factions, to mediating and negotiating conflict.

⁵⁵ Kinsley, "Tuan Guru, Community and Conflict".

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Agung, Anak Agung Ktut, *Kupu-kupu Kuning yang Terbang di Selat Lombok: Lintasan Sejarah Kerajaan Karangasem 1661-1950*, Denpasar: Upada Sastra, 1991.
- “Bentrok antar Pemuda, Satu Tewas”, *Lombok Post*, Bali, 20 Dec 2012.
- Budiwanti, Erni, *Islam Sasak: Wetu Telu versus Waktu Lima*, Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2000.
- , “Maintaining Identity and Inter-religious Tolerance: Cases Studies of Muslim Minorities in Lombok and Bali”, in *Communal Conflicts in Contemporary Indonesia*, ed. by Chaidar S. Bamualim and Karlina Helamnita, Jakarta: Pusat Bahasa dan Budaya IAIN Jakarta & The Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 2002.
- Cederroth, Sven, *The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power of Mekkah: A Sasak Community on Lombok*, Göteborg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1981.
- Coward, Harold and Gordon S. Smith (eds.), *Religion and Peacebuilding*, New York: SUNY Press, 2004.
- “Di Mataram Konflik Antarkampung, Made Ardiyana Tewas”, *BALIPOST.co.id*, 3 Sep 2013, <http://www.balipost.co.id/mediadetail.php?module=detailberita&kid=33&id=74540>, accessed 3 Sep 2013.
- “Dua Kampung Di-”Sweeping”, Tujuh Warga Diamankan, Puluhan Sajam Disita”, *Bali Post*, Bali, 14 Sep 2005, <http://www.balipost.co.id/balipostcetak/2005/9/14/nusatenggara.html>, accessed 6 Dec 2011.
- Frerks, Georg and Bart Klem (eds.), *Dealing with Diversity, Sri Lankan Discourses on Peace and Conflict*, Netherlands: Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael”, 2005.
- Howe, Leo, “Hinduism, Identity, and Social Conflict: The Sai Baba Movement in Bali”, in *Hinduism in Modern Indonesia: Between Local, National, and Global Interests*, ed. by Martin Ramstedt, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004.
- Israil, H. et al., “Dinamika Pluralisme Agama di Nusa Tenggara Barat”, *Jurnal Penelitian Keislaman*, vol. 1, no. 1, 2000, pp. 1–16.
- Jaffrelot, Christophe, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

- , "The 2002 Pogrom in Gujarat: The Post-9/11 Face of Hindu Nationalist and Anti-Muslim Violence", in *Religion and Violence in South Asia: Theory and Practice*, ed. by John Hinnells and Richard King, New York: Routledge, 2007.
- Kingsley, Jeremy, "Tuan Guru, Community and Conflict in Lombok, Indonesia", Thesis, Melbourne: University of Melbourne, 2010.
- "Lombok Timur Fasilitas Desa Buat Awik-Awik", *ANTARANTB.com*, 25 Dec 2010, <http://www.antarantb.com/berita/14382/lombok-timur-fasilitas-desa-buat-awik-awik>, accessed 10 Feb 2012.
- Malik MTT, *Pura dan Masjid: Konflik dan Integrasi pada Suku Tengger*, Jakarta: Balai Penelitian dan Pengembangan Agama, 2007.
- Merriam, Sharan B. and Elizabeth J. Tisdell, *Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and Implementation*, San Francisco, CA: John Wiley & Sons, 2009.
- Mustain and Mukhlis, *Hubungan Hindu Muslim di Kota Mataram: Kajian Potensi Integrasi dan Konflik dalam Hubungan antaragama*, Mataram: Lemlit STAIN, 2003.
- Narayan, Deepa, "Bonds and Bridges: Social Capital and Poverty", in *Social Capital and Economic Development: Well-being in Developing Countries*, ed. by Jonathan Isham, Thomas Kelly, and Sunder Ramaswamy, Cheltenham, UK1: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2002.
- Abu-Nimer, Mohammed, *Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam: Theory and Practice*, Florida: University Press of Florida, 2003.
- Panggabean, Syamsu Rizal and Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, "Dari Riset Perang ke Riset Bina Damai", in *Polisi, Masyarakat dan Konflik Keagamaan di Indonesia*, Jakarta: Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina, 2011.
- , "Dari Riset Perang ke Riset Bina Damai", in *Polisi, Masyarakat dan Konflik Keagamaan di Indonesia*, Jakarta: Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina, 2011.
- Patulny, Roger V. and Gunnar Lind Haase Svendsen, "Exploring the Social Capital Grid: Bonding, Bridging, Qualitative, Quantitative", *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, vol. 27, no. 1/2, 2007, pp. 32–51 [<http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/01443330710722742>].
- "Perkelahian Antarkampung di Mataram, Dua Warga Cedera", *LIPUTAN6.com*, 5 Jun 2002, <http://news.liputan6.com/read/33667/perkelahian-antarkampung-di-mataram-dua-warga->

cedera, accessed 17 Jul 2011.

Picard, Michel, "What's in a Name? Balinese Hinduism in the Making", in *Hinduism in Modern Indonesia: Between Local, National, and Global Interests*, ed. by Martin Ramstedt, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004.

Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Y. Nanetti, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.

"Rentetan Amuk di Pulau Lombok", *KORANTEMPO.com*, 1 Mar 2004, <http://www.infoanda.com/followlink.php?lh=VVAFBVwFVFtR>, accessed 31 Jan 2004.

Roof, Wade Clark, "Religion and Spirituality: Toward and Integrated Analysis", in *Handbook of the Sociology of Religion*, ed. by Michele Dillon, Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Ryan, Bartholomew John, *Alif Lam Mim: Kearifan Masyarakat Sasak*, trans. by Imron Rasyidi, Yogyakarta: Tiawa Wacana, 2001.

Stewart, David W., Prem N. Shamdasani, and Dennis W. Rook, *Focus Group Discussion: Theory and Practice*, California: Sage Publications, 1990.

Suaedy, Ahmad (ed.), *Politikasi Agama dan Konflik Komunal: Beberapa Isu Penting di Indonesia*, Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2007.

Suaedy, Ahmad and Rumadi (eds.), "Mengawal Pluralisme di Tengah Kegamangan Negara", in *Politikasi Agama dan Konflik Komunal: Beberapa Isu Penting di Indonesia*, Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2007.

Tim Puslitbang Kehidupan Beragama, *Pemetaan Kerukunan Kehidupan Beragama Di Nusa Tenggara Barat*, Jakarta: Badan Litbang dan Diklat, 2006, <http://balitbangdiklat.kemenag.go.id/konten-download/konten-hasil-penelitian/konten-kehidupan-beragama/pemetaan-kerukunan-kehidupan-beragama-di-nusa-tenggara-barat.html>, accessed 10 Feb 2012.

Varshney, Ashutosh, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India*, London: Yale University Press, 2002.

Wahbān, Aḥmad, *al-Ṣirāt al-Irqīyah wa-Istiqrār al-Ālam al-Muāṣir: Dirāsah fī al-Aqallīyāt wa'l-Jamā'āt wa-al-Ḥarakāt al-Irqīyah*, al-Iskandarīyah: Dār al-Jāmi'ah al-Jadīdah lil-Nashr, 1997.

Zakaria, Fathurrahman, *Mozaik Budaya Orang Mataram*, Mataram: Yayasan Sumurmas Al-Hamidy, 1998.